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Abstract
Multinational Companies (mnes) have a long presence in the 
automobile industry in Mexico, since 1925. The North America 
free trade agreement (nafta) has promoted this foreign-owned 
industry to develop the locally owned auto supplier industry. In 
this study, we focus on two analyses: in the ﬁ  rst one, the “Double 
Diamond” model is used to examine the sources of competitive-
ness of the auto industry, the auto suppliers, and the possible spi-
llover effects on ﬁ  rst and second tier suppliers. In the second one, 
we focus on a local case by analyzing the cluster located in Puebla 
to see the relations between the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
Volkswagen (oem vw) and its suppliers. Our ﬁ  ndings indicate 
that the foreign-owned auto industry in Mexico has been success-
ful in terms of gaining world’s export market share within the pe-
riod 1993-2003 and that mnes have promoted the competitiveness 
of some existing locally owned suppliers through collaborative 
agreements and joint ventures. The local case of the Puebla cluster 
reveals that some local, in its majority foreign-owned, auto sup-
pliers have been certiﬁ  ed and integrated as tier 1 suppliers of the 
oem vw, but there is not enough evidence that tier 2 and 3 locally 
owned suppliers have been fully integrated into the supply chain.
Keywords: technology spillover, double diamond model, mul-
tinational enterprise, local content, oem.Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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El papel de las empresas  multinacionales en lo países huéspedes: derramas 
relacionadas con la presencia de las empresas productoras de automóviles en 
México
Las  empresas multinacionales tienen presencia en la industria automotriz en México desde 
1923.  El Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (tlcan) ha buscado promover 
que estas empresas de capital extranjero desarrollen proveedores locales. En este estudio 
nos enfocamos en dos análisis: en primer lugar, el modelo de “doble diamante” se usa para 
examinar fuentes de competitividad de la industria automotriz, de los proveedores y de las 
posibles derramas hacia proveedores de primer y segundo niveles; en segundo lugar, nos 
centramos en un caso local examinando el cluster ubicado en Puebla para ver la relación 
entre la multinacional, Volkswagen, y sus proveedores. Nuestros hallazgos indican que 
la industria automotriz de capital extranjero ha sido exitosa en términos de exportar y 
ganar segmentos del mercado mundial en el periodo 1993-2003 y las  multinacionales han 
promovido la competitividad de algunos proveedores de capital local a través de acuerdos 
de colaboración y joint ventures. El caso del cluster de Puebla revela que proveedores de 
capital extranjero, y solamente algunos proveedores de locales, han sido certiﬁ  cados e inte-
grados como proveedores de primer nivel de Volkswagen, pero no hay suﬁ  ciente evidencia 
que los proveedores de segundo y tercer niveles locales hayan sido integrados a la cadena 
de proveeduría. 
Introduction
Multinational Companies (mnes) have a long history in the automobile industry in 
Mexico, the ﬁ  rst assembly plants were established in 1925 (Micheli, 1994). Des-
pite the fact that the Mexican manufacturing industry in general followed a pro-
tectionist model for many years, the auto industry in particular had seen a constant 
presence of foreign-owned ﬁ  rms originally oriented to the domestic market and la-
ter oriented to export markets through the implementation of some Auto Decrees, 
with no dramatic outcomes before nafta (Ochoa-Valladolid, 2005). Then, Mexico 
moved  toward a free market model,  starting with the incorporation of Mexico into 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) in 1986 (Secretaria de Eco-
nomia, 2004) and continuing with the signature of the nafta agreement in 1993. 
One of the anticipated advantages of nafta was to maintain and attract mnes, 
especially auto car assemblers, with the expectation that such companies would 
use substantial amounts of “local content”, (i.e. parts produced by local suppliers). 
This strategy was intended to develop and strengthen local-owned suppliers (i.e. 
Mexican investments) by establishing supply relationships with foreign-owned The role of multinationals in the host country
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car assemblers. The further expectation was that this relationship would produce 
spillover effects such as the transfer of technology, extended collaborative agree-
ments, and the creation of a national infrastructure to support this industry. After 
more than ten years with nafta in place, however, two questions remain largely 
unanswered: First, is there evidence of a general increase in the competitiveness 
of the auto industry? Second, to what extent can any such increase be attributed to 
the emergence of a national industry of auto parts suppliers? First, we use the “Do-
uble Diamond” model (Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993; Rugman and Verbeke, 1993) 
based on Porter’s (1990) Diamond Model to analyze the sources of competitive 
advantage of the auto industry and the auto suppliers in general. Second, we focus 
on the automotive cluster located in the state of Puebla to analyze the relationship 
between the Original Equipment Manufacturer (oem) Volskwagen (vw) and its 
suppliers, in terms of spill over effects (e.g. Blomström and Kokko, 1998; Kokko, 
1994; Lall, 1978). Finally, we discuss practical implications for the industry, based 
on the evidence presented in this case study.
Literature review
The double diamond model of national competitiveness
Porter (1990) developed “the Diamond Model”, a conceptual framework that may 
be used to analyze the sources of competitiveness for a given industry within a par-
ticular country. These sources are argued to arise from four national determinants 
of competitive advantage, government policies, and change. We use three determi-
nants for this paper: 1) factor conditions and the infrastructure necessary to com-
pete globally in that industry, 2) ﬁ  rm strategy, structure, and rivalry that increases 
competitive ﬁ  tness within the industry, and 3) supporting and related industries 
that enhance the ability of the focal industry to compete locally and internationally. 
The model suggests that to be internationally competitive, it is necessary to have 
a strong national diamond or strong “home base”. Some scholars have argued that 
many small economies that have opened to international trade do not have strong 
national diamonds (Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993). Instead, they have at least one 
weak corner of the national diamond that requires reliance on the corresponding 
corner of a foreign diamond. In this sense, Rugman and Verbeke’s (1993) analy-
sis contended that ﬁ  rms’ competitiveness in small economies is inﬂ  uenced by the 
host Diamond and other nations’ diamonds. This argument suggests that in some 
countries the diamond model of a particular industry is linked to the diamond of Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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another country in terms of one of the determinants (Rugman and D’Cruz, 1993). 
The general case of Mexico is discussed by Hodgetts (1993), who suggested the 
importance of using a “Double Diamond” framework and made special emphasis 
for the implementation of the nafta agreement. We use the “Double Diamond fra-
mework to analyze the sources of competitiveness of the auto industry in Mexico 
in general, by focusing on three of the “determinants” of national competitiveness: 
factor conditions, ﬁ  rm strategy, and supporting industries. The rationale for using 
these three is that they provide the context for the analysis of the Mexican infras-
tructure that supports the auto industry as an export platform.
The role of multinational enterprises and spillover effects
We would expect that continuous levels of Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) will in-
crease the participation of indigenous suppliers based on the literature of spill over 
effects (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). These spillover effects are created through 
the interaction between the mne and the local ﬁ  rms, in which the mnes transfer 
knowledge to the local ﬁ  rms (Kokko, 1994) such as the use of statistical process 
control, information systems, and logistical (just-in-time) supply systems, impro-
ving their quality, productivity and service levels. For these transfers to occur, it is 
necessary that mnes establish backward and forward relationships with suppliers 
(Lall, 1978). Foreign companies also create joint ventures with local ﬁ  rms in order 
to exchange beneﬁ  ts, such as learning (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001). However, a 
minimum threshold of human capital understanding must already exist, called ab-
sorptive capacity, within a local ﬁ  rm in order for it to acquire advanced knowledge 
(Lall, 1996; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Some studies have found advantages of 
being part of a cluster such as technology transfer (Altenburg, 2000; Patibandla 
and Petersen, 2002), communication, information ﬂ  ow, pull of skilled workers, 
and common infrastructure (Pouder and St John, 1996; Bell, 2005). Finally, mnes 
provide training to their own employees who may later go on to create their own 
local ﬁ  rms (Meyer, 2004). For this paper, we are interested in the possible spill 
over effects from the auto industry on the related industries such as locally owned 
suppliers, technology transfers, and the creation of new start-ups.
Methodology
The case study method is a useful way to explore a theoretical framework when it 
is important to study a phenomenon in context and there are many variables to ex-The role of multinationals in the host country
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plore (Yin, 2003). The case is focused on two levels of analysis: the auto industry 
in general and the local cluster in Puebla were vw is located. We use the Double 
Diamond framework to explore three out of the four “determinants” to identify 
sources of competitiveness of the auto industry. The two points in time analy-
zed were 1993 (pre-nafta) and 2003 (10 years post-nafta). According to Porter 
(1990), the indicators of the international competitiveness of an industry are: 1) 
Sustainable increase in exports to the world, 2) Increase in world share exports, in 
a particular industry, 3) Foreign Direct Investment in that industry, 4) Trade balan-
ce in that industry, and 5) Proportion of exports in that industry with respect to the 
total exports of the country in a particular year (p.739-744). We use the comtra-
de data base of the United Nations, employing the Industrial Trade Classiﬁ  cation 
(sitc) Revision 3. We use archival sources such as industry reports, industry ma-
gazines, industry association information, nafta documents, academic journals, 
and government studies. Finally, we interviewed 15 managers and representatives 
of ﬁ  rms within the vw cluster in Puebla, including the General Manager of the 
Mexican Automotive Parts Association, managers from vw Mexico, bmw Mexico, 
representatives of nafin Puebla, Public Relations representative of Rassini Frenos 
and Vitro, and other representatives of tier 1 suppliers. 
The competitiveness of the automobile industry in Mexico
Antecedents and free trade
It is clear that government rules, policies, and free trade agreements have contribu-
ted in large part to the current situation in the Mexican auto industry. There have 
been four distinct regulatory periods for the automotive industry in Mexico that 
have been characterized as: vehicle imports, import substitution, development of 
national auto parts ﬁ  rms, and free trade (cecic, 2002). In the ﬁ  rst stage, Mexico 
satisﬁ  ed its domestic needs through very simple vehicle assembly facilities and 
importing cars from the U.S., car prices were controlled by the government and 
the local content of the auto industry was less than 20%. Then, an import substitu-
tion model was implemented to the auto industry by government decrees in 1962, 
1972, and 1977 with the intent to develop an auto parts industry (Brown, 2000) and 
to promote exportations of cars (Ochoa-Valladolid, 2005). At that time, fdi in a 
particular project was limited to 49% and the number of car assemblers and brands 
offered were also limited. These conditions should have allowed indigenous su-
ppliers to grow and feed the industry. Local content was required to be 60% for 
cars. But by the late 70’s, Mexico had a trade deﬁ  cit and problems in acquiring ca-Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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pital goods. The cars produced in Mexico were old models with poor quality. Then, 
further government decrees were released in 1977 and 1987 in order to promote an 
export activity (Brown, 2000). At this stage the hope was to maintain the growth of 
local suppliers, but local content was reduced to 36% for those companies to focus 
on developing their export markets. Foreign ownership was allowed in auto parts 
ﬁ  rms with the purpose of increasing technology, but only if they exported.  Later, 
Mexico incorporated ﬁ  rst the gatt (now the wto), and then the nafta agreement, 
with the expectation that the auto industry increase its export proﬁ  le. In this period, 
imports of brand new cars were permitted, the market was opened to new car ass-
emblers, and the percentages of local content were reviewed (Brown, 2000). The 
percentages were ﬁ  xed according to different periods of time: 50% (1995-1997), 
56% (1998-2000), and 62.5% (since 2001) (Bancomext, 2004). This local content 
had to be maintained if car assemblers wanted to be granted 0% on tariffs when ex-
porting to the other regions of nafta. Despite the fact that some of the Automotive 
Decrees (e.g. 1972, 1977) had tried to promote an export orientation with more 
value-added, before nafta (Ochoa-Valladolid, 2005, Shaiken, 1993; Shaiken & 
Herzenberg, 1989), the Mexican manufacturing industry changed its export proﬁ  le 
from a resource-based orientation concentrated on the petroleum industry (before 
nafta) to a more value-added manufacturing orientation (after nafta). However, 
the auto industry became the main manufacturing employer in Mexico providing 
jobs for 19.8% of the total manufacturing work force in 2004 (Industria Nacional 
de Autopartes (ina), 2004). By 2003, Mexico was the 8th largest producer of cars 
in the world (Instituto de Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la Republica 
(iilsen), 2003), the world’s tenth largest automobile exporter2 and the world’s ﬁ  fth 
largest light trucks exporter3, with a specialization in the production of small and 
midsize cars, light trucks, and auto parts (Vega and De la Mora, 2003, p.176). The 
exports of cars (sitc 7812), auto parts (sitc 784), and light trucks (sitc 7821) were 
in the top 10 export industries in Mexico in 1993 rising to the top 3 by 2003. In 
1993, cars, auto parts, and light trucks accounted for 13.4% of total Mexican ex-
ports, while in 2003 they represented 15 %. These three industries increased their 
share of total world exports from 2.3%, 2.4%, and 1.9%, respectively in 1993 to 
2.7%, 3.9%, and 9.8% in 2003 (table 1).
2 Author's calculations based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved June 15, 2005 from http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade.
3 Ibidem.The role of multinationals in the host country
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Table 1
Top mexican industry exporters, 1993-2003
Source: Based on United Nations Statistics Division Data, retrieved November 30, 2004 from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/
From 1993 to 2003, cars, auto parts, and light trucks gained 0.4%, 1.5%, and 7.9% 
respectively in share of total world exports. Next to the petroleum industry, cars, 
auto parts, and light trucks were the industries with the next highest export value 
of the total Mexican exports, and they grew more than the petroleum industry. The 
exports of each of these industries grew more than the world’s exports in each in-
dustry respectively. It is interesting to note that the auto parts sub-industry changed 
its balance of trade from positive to negative in this period, while the cars and light 
trucks sub-industries have increased their positive balance of trade. This means 
that Mexico is importing more auto parts and components than it is exporting, 
despite the increase of 248% in the export value of this sub-industry. This is per-
haps consistent with the relocation of assembly facilities into Mexico which might 
previously have been located in the USA. The total fdi in the 1994 to 2004 period 
has been US$148,472 million, 49% of which went to manufacturing industries 
(inegi, 2005a), with 9% overall going to the automobile industry (Department of 
Foreign Investment of the Ministry of the Economy Mexico, 2005; eclac, 2000). 
The fdi ﬂ  ow investment has also touched the auto parts industry, if we look at the 
$9.39 billion US dollars in fdi ﬂ  ow into the auto industry, from 1999 to 20044, 
62% was directed to the auto parts industry (Department of Foreign Investment of 
the Ministry of the Economy Mexico, 2005). 
Industry
Rank within the Total
Mexican Exports
Wold Export Rank
Gain in 
Share of 
Total World 
Exports
Increase 
in Export 
Value
World 
Export 
Growth
1993 2003 1993 2003
PETROLEUM 
OILS
1 1 - - 1.7% 159% -
Cars SITC 
7812
2 2 10 10 0.4% 196% 148%
Auto Parts 
SITC 784
4 3 9 8 1.5% 248% 117%
Light Trucks 
SITC 7821
10 4 11 5 7.9% 892% 106%
4 Note that we found data from 1999 to 2004; however, the point we want to make is that a constant ﬂ  ow of FDI has 
been invested in both the auto and auto parts industry during the following ten years of the signature of NAFTA.Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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In conclusion, Mexican performance in the three auto industry sectors outpaced 
world export growth placing Mexico in the top ten exporters from 1993 to 2003. 
According to the Secretaria de Economia (2004), only two other industries have had 
similar average growth over the period 1993-2003: Electric & Electronic and Textile 
& Apparel. The former offering more value added and technology, while the latter 
characterized as labour intensive and more sensitive to be shifted to China.
Sources of competitiveness
Factor conditions
Initially, the factors that made Mexico attractive to automotive mnes were cheap 
raw materials and labour, semi-skilled and skilled workers, less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations and market access to the U.S. and Latin America (iilsen, 
2003). The majority were basic factors, with exception of the base of skilled-wor-
kers. Mexico also has a comparative advantage in the steel industry over countries 
such as Brazil, Taiwan, and Korea that is reﬂ  ected in the price of raw materials be-
ing from 15% to 30% cheaper (Centro de Capital Intelectual y Competitividad (ce-
cic, 2002)). As Mexico entered into freer trade, market forces saw the preparation 
of an industrial infrastructure developed initially during the import substitution 
industrialization period (Middlebrook and Zepeda, 2003, p.20) and streamlined 
with the ﬂ  ows of fdi after nafta. Then, productivity in the terminal industry (car 
assembly) had grown 220% by 2003, if we take 1993 as a base (inegi, 2005b). 
Another important factor condition for a superior export platform is transportation 
infrastructure: highways connecting the North and South American markets and 
ports for the European and Asian markets. The highways in Mexico are well deve-
loped, but some of them carry the highest toll rates in the world, which represent a 
barrier to competitiveness. Similarly, the Mexican-US border has bottlenecks due 
to the corruption of customs ofﬁ  cials, security concerns and drug trafﬁ  c (Prentice 
and Ojaj, 2002). Ports infrastructure has become more adequate and competitive, 
since nafta allowed their privatization and fdi has helped to modernize them, but 
there is still a need to improve land infrastructure and transportation (Prentice and 
Ojaj, 2002). 
Mexico has not developed advanced factors, such as research institutes that colla-
borate with the industry to upgrade productivity and technology. Mexico is still a 
technology follower in that it has not taken enough advantage of foreign techno-
logy (Valdes, 2002, p. 75). In general, the relationship between universities and The role of multinationals in the host country
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industry has not been well developed. The increase in internal expenditures in 
research and development was from 0.22% of gdp in 1993 to 0.40 % in 2002 (Fox, 
2004). This is substantially lower than other countries that invested in the auto 
industry in Mexico, such as the U.S. (2.67%), Canada (1.82%), Germany (2.51%), 
and Japan (3.06%) in 2002 (Fox, 2004). Finally, the creation of new start-ups was 
refrained due to the lack of capital, when the Mexican peso was devalued against 
the U.S. dollar. This crisis produced an inter-bank annual interest rate of 90.5%. 
In conclusion, there has been an evolution of factor conditions after 10 years of 
nafta, from an emphasis on basic factors to an early stage of advanced factors. 
There is a strong base of engineers and technicians as well as the high levels of 
productivity as noted above. Through the ﬂ  ows of fdi since the inception of naf-
ta, all of the manufacturing facilities of car assemblers have been modernized to 
transform Mexico into a successful export platform. 
Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry
The automobile industry in Mexico has a long history, Micheli (1994) reports that 
the ﬁ  rst assembly facility was established by Ford in 1925.  By 1962, vw was fo-
llowing those steps after its experience of exporting cars from Germany to Mexico. 
After that, gm, Nissan, and Daimler-Chrysler established factories in 1963, 1966, 
and 1968 respectively. It is interesting to note that by 1971, just two state-owned 
ﬁ  rms have Mexican capital: vam and dina-Renault that were sold by 1993 to Re-
nault-France (Ochoa-Valladolid, 2005, Shaiken, 1993).5 By 2003, approximately 
eighteen automakers distributed cars in Mexico, eight of them have manufacturing 
facilities in the country and the rest import cars. There are four major automotive 
clusters in Mexico: Northeast and West, and Center East and West. The northern 
clusters were located with the purpose to export to the U.S. and Canada. Around 
these 4 clusters of automobile plants, a collection of suppliers and related indus-
tries have been attracted that have complemented the development of the industry. 
Streamlining and automation have required more skilled workers. All Mexican fa-
cilities have shifted from producing largely for the local market to exporting, with 
attendant increases in technological sophistication (Brown, 2000). So, with the 
opening of free trade, the market share has had to be reassigned among many more 
competitors and the European and Asian cars have been stealing market share from 
5 By 1983, the automakers were in hands of foreign capital only.Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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the Big Three. By 2004, these two regions accounted for almost 50% of the market 
with the “Big Three” having lost 15% of overall market share since their maximum 
peak during 1996 and 1997 (amia, 2005). 
After 10 years of nafta, the intense competition among the many car assemblers 
with manufacturing facilities in Mexico and the increase of other imported brands 
appears to generate intense rivalry within the industry as competitors attempt to 
gain or maintain a share of the local market. But it is also competition for the U.S. 
(and indeed, world) market(s) that pressures the car assemblers in Mexico to pro-
duce with high levels of technology in order to upgrade the productivity standards 
that are necessary to satisfy export markets. 
Related and supporting industries: the auto suppliers
The supply chain structure in Mexico follows the same structure of the auto in-
dustry around the world. The U.S. and European automakers have attempted to 
copy the Japanese way of production, in which car assemblers outsource entire 
components to a hierarchy of suppliers (eclac, 2004; Gerefﬁ  , 2003, p. 212). In this 
integrated system, tier 1 suppliers are the direct producers of integrated systems 
for car assemblers and tier 2 suppliers produce components for tier 1 suppliers. At 
the end of the supply chain there are tier 3 ﬁ  rms, and in some cases tier 4 ones that 
supply standardized products such as part metals and connectors (eclac, 2004). 
According to Bancomext (2004), in 1994 there were 600 auto suppliers in Mexi-
co, which by 2001, had grown to 875 registered auto parts suppliers, 60 of them 
tier 1 (Bancomext, 2002) (cited in eclac, 2004). By 2003 the number had further 
increased to 1350 registered auto suppliers with 281 of them being tier 1 suppliers 
(Bancomext, 2004). According to ina (2004), the ownership structure of the auto 
parts industry in Mexico comprises 70% of foreign-owned ﬁ  rms and 30% of in-
digenous ﬁ  rms. These foreign-owned auto suppliers have established themselves 
in Mexico as a direct result of local content conditions that set the rules of origin, 
demanding that 62.5% of engines and transmissions and 50% of other parts used 
in automobile manufacturing in Mexico must themselves be produced in Mexico 
(Chambers and Smith, 2002, p.4). The tier 1 auto parts suppliers have establis-
hed their manufacturing facilities around the four automotive clusters and unfor-
tunately for the development of indigenous ﬁ  rms, a 100% foreign-owned tier 1 
supplier (or maquiladora) established in Mexico is considered by nafta as “local”. 
Thus by doing little more than employing local labour, the auto supply chain can The role of multinationals in the host country
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satisfy the rule of origin (local content). Then, tier 1 suppliers can be categorized 
as one of four types: A) Foreign-owned ﬁ  rms often supply more than one of the 
car assemblers. The top 10 Original Equipment Manufacturing (oem) suppliers for 
North America are: Delphi, Visteon, Lear Corp., Magna International, Johnson 
Controls, Dana Corp., Bosch, TRW, Denso Int’l America, ThyssenKrupp, among 
others (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2004). All of them have a presence in 
Mexico. Carrillo and Lara’s work (2003) found that after nafta, a new generation 
of facilities support the industry. They have not only assembly and manufacturing 
functions, but also specialization in design, research, and supply chain manage-
ment. B) Subsidiaries are wholly owned operations of the car assemblers and 
generally have little margin to create designs because usually the headquarters are 
responsible for those activities. Some subsidiaries such as Delphi Corp. (gm) and 
Visteon (Ford) have evolved to become independent, although still foreign-owned, 
ﬁ  rms. C) Indigenous conglomerates constitute the smallest category of supplier 
(see table 2). They are diversiﬁ  ed companies with a long tradition in Mexico. All 
of them, with the exception of Grupo quimmco, have at least 30 years of expe-
rience. These companies have created strategic alliances or joint-ventures with 
foreign-owned companies, the majority of them in the auto parts industry, in order 
to acquire technology, know-how, expertise, or to work in collaborative projects 
with the automakers and auto-parts makers. These ﬁ  rms have high levels of tech-
nology, productivity, and quality. All of them have acquired international quality 
and reliability certiﬁ  cations such as qs-9000, iso, vda 6.1, among others, in order 
to be able to work for the automakers. All Mexican tier 1 suppliers have some level 
of research & development activities. D) Imported parts from foreign ﬁ  rms, in 
other countries, are the ﬁ  nal category. These imports have a presence in the entire 
supply chain. As discussed above, Mexico has a negative trade balance in this sub-
industry. Local auto parts ﬁ  rms satisfy just 23% of the local market, while the rest 
is covered by imports (iilsen, 2003). Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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Table 2
Indigenous tier 1 suppliers in Mexico
Source: Company's reports and websites, and interviews.
Company Establishment Products R&D, Design. Strategic Alliances/ JIV
VITRO 1909 Flat glass (cars), glass
containers, and 
glassware
Flat glass designs for 
auto makers
Pilkington(UK), 
Visteon(U.S.), Quimica
M. (U.S.)
Grupo 
Industrial 
Saltillo
1928 Autoparts (steel motor
parts), Construccion,
Household
Industrial Designs. 
Agreement of 
Technology Tranfers
Hydro Aluminium 
Holding Deutschland 
(Germany). VAW 
Yorkshire Foundries 
Limited
SANLUIS 
Rassini
1929 Suspension 
component systems, 
leaf springs, brake and 
system components
SANLUIS Rassini 
Technical Center in 
Plymouth , Michigan 
(2000)
Brembo S.p.A. (Italy), 
NHK Spring(Japan), 
Fabrini and Cimebra 
(Brazil)
Industrias de 
Hule Galgo, 
S.A. de C.V
1952 Rubber for retread 
tires, butyl radial 
inner tubes, and boots 
and automotive parts
Technical Training 
Center. Prduct design
N/A
Grupo Carso 
(Condumex)
1954 Automotive Parts 
and Electronics, 
Automotive Cable, 
Cables, Energy, 
Installations
CONDUMEX 
Research and 
Development Center 
(CIDEC) 
Leading global autoparts 
companies (i.e. Delphi)
Grupo Proeza 
(Metalsa)
1956 Automotive (chasis, 
suspensions), Juices 
& fruits, Business 
Development
All stages in platforms 
development
Ogihara Corporation 
(Japan), Miyasu 
Seisakusho(Japan), 
Sumitomo Corp(Japan)
Grupo DESC 
Automotriz
1973 Autoparts, Chemicals, 
Food, Real State Six Engineering and 
Development Centers
Dana Corporation
(U.S.), Delphi(U.S.), 
GKN, Hayes Lemmerz 
International y TRW
Grupo ALFA 1974 Auto parts, Steel, 
Petrochemicals, 
Food, &  
Telecommunications
Technological 
developments are 
the patented by the 
subsidiary Nemak. 
Strategic alliances to 
acquire technology
Ford(U.S.), 
Worthington(U.S.), AK 
Steel (U.S.), among 
others. 
Grupo 
QUIMMCO
1994 Automotive 
components, 
chemicals, and 
construction 
industries
Quimmco Centro 
Tecnológico.
Design and 
manufacturing of 
molds
ArvinMeritor, Inc. and 
New Holland
N.V (CNH Global, N.V.)The role of multinationals in the host country
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The second level, tier 2 suppliers, is based largely on indigenous conglomerates 
and small and medium indigenous suppliers. However, many foreign owned tier 
1 ﬁ  rms import a substantial part of the raw materials they need, so as to maintain 
their own international levels of competitiveness (cecic, 2002). Some interviews 
from tier 1 suppliers contended that tier 2 indigenous suppliers have problems 
to supply them in terms of quantity and quality. The tier 3 suppliers segment is 
composed mainly of indigenous small and medium size suppliers of standard raw 
materials and imports from foreign ﬁ  rms located in other countries.  
In conclusion, after analyzing the supply chain in the auto industry in Mexico, it 
seems that there is a strong structure of tier 1 suppliers of which the majority are 
global suppliers. There is also evidence of a few indigenous tier 1 suppliers that 
have a long history in Mexico, and after ten years of nafta, they have arranged 
collaborative agreements with global companies. In doing so, they have acquired 
high-tech capital equipment and expertise. These few diversiﬁ  ed companies, along 
with other business groups, have a dominant position within “the indigenous priva-
te sector” in Mexico (Sargent & Ghaddar, 2001). The next levels of suppliers, tier 
2 and tier 3, seem to be not well integrated into the supply chain and there is limi-
ted evidence of the creation of new small and medium size enterprises (smes).
The case of VW and its suppliers in the Puebla cluster
Carrillo and Lara (2003) argue that the presence of mne auto manufacturers in 
Mexico has produced signiﬁ  cant regional developments in terms of workers’ lear-
ning and new start-ups, both local and foreign-owned. We focus on the Volkswa-
gen cluster in the state of Puebla that has been established since 1962. First, some 
descriptive facts: this cluster agglomerates an important grouping of suppliers and 
related industries; however, it is itself part of one of the four larger clusters, Center 
East, mentioned earlier. Within the Central East area of Mexico are the states of 
Hidalgo, Mexico City, Morelos, Puebla, and Tlaxcala. From this total area, vw 
sources auto parts from nearly 300 suppliers. vw Puebla has historically had the 
greatest levels of local (indigenous and foreign-owned ﬁ  rms) purchasing. Thus, if 
mnes play a signiﬁ  cant role in sustainable national competitiveness, we expected 
to ﬁ  nd it here where there are more indigenous suppliers than in other clusters. 
We also hoped to reach some conclusions about why vw has reached this level of 
indigenous supply chain contribution, given the clear policy implications. Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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As we examined vw, in more detail, we found evidence that, by 2000, vw had be-
neﬁ  ted its 285 suppliers by acquiring 60% of its inputs from them and had helped 
200 of them to get certiﬁ  ed (iso 9000 and vda 6.1) through its Institute of Training 
and Development (Comunicación Corporativa vw, 2001). However, only 60 of 
them are located within the Puebla cluster, and 27 are located right immediately 
beside the vw facilities to support just-in-time delivery (Comunicación Corpo-
rativa vw, 2004). Therefore, while its use of indigenous suppliers is better than 
most, the fuzziness of the local vs. indigenous distinction discussed above remains 
evident when vw’s major suppliers are examined. Although ‘local’, the majority 
of the most important tier 1 suppliers of vw in Puebla have German origin. This 
is not surprising, since in the 90’s The German Big Three (vw, bmw, Mercedes-
Benz) started a process of globalization in which it was deemed critical that tier 1 
suppliers should have production factories close to the car assembler’s plant (Pries, 
1999).  Since these suppliers, at the time, were German ﬁ  rms and local content 
rules did not recognize country of ownership, it was natural that the existing su-
ppliers would simply locate their manufacturing facilities adjacent to the Puebla 
vw plant. 
It is possible, however, to see the wholesale arrival of German suppliers as a ne-
cessary bridge toward a larger role for indigenous ﬁ  rms since local ﬁ  rms were not 
in a position at that time to take up this work. These German suppliers would need 
to source their own inputs from tier 2 suppliers that presumably could be indige-
nous ﬁ  rms leading to a gradual upgrading of local competencies. For example, 
the industrial park, Finsa, that contains the vw cluster, is composed mainly of 
auto part ﬁ  rms wherein there are two meetings a year in which every ﬁ  rm dis-
cusses common interest issues. In addition, the cluster promotes the development 
of human capital resources (Pries, 1999) which has led to an abundant source of 
Mexican engineers and technicians available within the cluster. According to a 
vw executive, the manufacturing facilities to produce the New Beetle and Bora 
models have high standards of productivity and technology. These models are only 
produced in Mexico, and, with the Jetta G5 model, are exported to foreign markets, 
especially to U.S. and Canada. The designs of the ﬁ  rst two models were made in 
Germany, but all the manufacturing plants of the group have to compete for the 
exclusivity of production. The decision to produce the New Beetle only in Puebla 
was made based on: geographic position, the industrial park in the region, and the 
established global suppliers there (Tovar, 2000). vw of Mexico also has a training 
institute to provide several kinds of managerial, technical, and quality expertise for 
the organization itself and to current or potential suppliers. vw, jointly with some The role of multinationals in the host country
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government programs, is helping to upgrade the knowledge and skills of 200 small 
and medium size indigenous companies that provide services and complementary 
materials. Some of these programs are: compite, crece, and nafin (Comunica-
ción Corporativa vw, 2001). Notwithstanding, evidence reveals that only tier 1 
ﬁ  rms work in close collaboration with vw in long term contracts, while tier 2 and 
3 suppliers, of which just a few are certiﬁ  ed in qs-9000, iso 9000, and vda 6.1, are 
not clearly incorporated into the supply chain. For vw Mexico, the work that has 
been done to help their 200 ‘local’ suppliers (i.e. tier 1) to be certiﬁ  ed in quality 
standards has been successful. However, the majority of them are other mnes or 
joint ventures with Mexican ﬁ  rms, not stand-alone indigenous ﬁ  rms. Once again, 
success stories do exist but they are limited. A manager from a supply company 
for vw mentioned two successful cases of indigenous tier 2 suppliers that had 
replaced imports from U.S. companies of steel and sand. Both were certiﬁ  ed and 
have continued supplying the quantities speciﬁ  ed. Overall, the presence of vw in 
Mexico as a mne has contributed to some extent to the region and relatively close 
locations with tier 1 suppliers. However, there remains little evidence that tier 2 
and tier 3 suppliers have become part of the supply chain, with long terms con-
tracts. These results are similar to other clusters in the country. For instance, the 
cluster around Nissan’s manufacturing facilities is based on fully integrated tier 1 
Japanese companies with indigenous suppliers providing only indirect materials 
and services such as transportation of personnel, security, and ofﬁ  ces supplies.6 
In the case of the northern clusters, there is evidence that some producers of steel 
mechanical pieces have evolved and now are suppliers of tier 1 ﬁ  rms. But, again, 
these are isolated cases. At this time, it is more accurate to say that the presence of 
vw has not fostered a massive development of indigenous suppliers. 
Discussion and conclusions
A summary table containing the assessment of each of the three determinants of 
the Diamond model framework that were analyzed is shown (see table 3). This 
table makes reference to both the Mexican diamond itself and the U.S. diamond 
supporting the Mexican diamond. Each of the sources of competitive advantage 
is rated at three possible levels: High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L) or, in some 
cases, at a transition stage (i.e. L-M from Low to Medium). These assessments are 
based on the authors’ analysis of the archival data and interviews.
6 According to an interview with a government representative of the auto cluster in the State of Aguascalientes.Salvador Barragán and John Usher
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Table 3
Assessment of the Mexican Diamond and Double Diamond (U.S.)
The Mexican diamond for the auto industry could be characterized as moderately 
competitive across most of the Diamond’s determinants with its relative success 
on the global stage attributable to substantial support from the U.S. diamond. In 
other words, despite the fact that Mexico has won an increasing share of total 
world exports in small and midsize cars, light trucks, and auto parts, there is strong 
evidence that the exclusively domestic determinants of Mexico’s national Dia-
mond are not the main sources of its competitiveness. fdi has supported three of 
the “determinants” of national competitiveness: factor conditions, ﬁ  rm strategy, 
and related industries. Consequently, the U.S. automobile industry has thus taken 
advantage of nafta’s regionalization impact, in which both Canada and Mexico 
play important roles as car producers and auto parts producers. In this respect, 
Rugman and Verbeke (2004) have argued that the majority of mnes follow re-
gional strategies, rather than global strategies, citing the fact that 80.3% of the 
total sales of 320 ﬁ  rms they studied were done in the home region of their triad 
(nafta, EU, or Asia). Based on this study’s ﬁ  ndings, the presence of the mne 
vw has played an important role for substantial growth and development within 
the Puebla industrial cluster and nearby industrial locations. Mexican conglome-
rates have increased their expertise, technology, and export value as examples of 
Country Diamon Concept Factor Conditions Firm Strategy, 
Structure, and 
Rivalry
Related and 
Supporting 
Industries
Assessment M H L-M
Mexico Sources of 
Competitiveness
Basic industrial 
infrastructure. 
Skilled workers. 
Productivity.
Low cost raw 
materials and 
labour.
Market access.
Strong competition 
among many global 
ﬁ  rms since 1994 
that was intensiﬁ  ed 
with the imports 
of Asian and 
European cars
Small base of 
indigenous Tier 1 
suppliers.
Aluminium and 
Steel Industry. 
JVs between 
indigenous ﬁ  rms
and foreign-owned 
suppliers.
Assessment H H H
U.S. support Sources of 
Competitiveness
U.S. MNEs 
automakers FDI
in Mexico.
Car assemblers 
Technology
Externalized by 
U.S. demand 
conditions and FDI 
in Mexico
U.S. MNEs global 
suppliers FDI
in MexicoThe role of multinationals in the host country
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spillover effects due to transfer of technology (Kokko, 1994). Another form of 
spillover effect has been the relationships between car assemblers and local-owned 
and foreign-owned suppliers, in which quality, just-in-time, and skill development 
are required as stated by Lall (1978). However, there is only limited evidence of 
technology transfer from mnes to indigenous small and medium size ﬁ  rms inside 
the vw cluster, the major transfer has taken place between vw and foreign-owned 
suppliers that are established within this region. 
We conclude with this evidence that Mexico has achieved some level of competi-
tiveness as an export platform in this industry. However, the sources of advanta-
ge can be emulated by other emergent economies (Vicencio-Miranda, 2008). For 
instance, China is rapidly moving from just assembling products with low labour 
costs to more sophisticated manufacturing, while maintaining its low costs (Álva-
rez-Medina & Sepúlveda-Reyes, 2006). Its ability to leverage technology transfers 
means that it is also producing its own Chinese car (Wu, 2006). Future research 
can be focused on how to develop more fully the next steps that policy makers 
should take to promote the development of tier 2 and 3 suppliers because it seems 
that after more than ten years of nafta, there are still only a few isolated success 
cases and as pointed out by Contreras (2008), the auto industry is characterized by 
a modular manufacture and the outsourcing of products and services, which bring 
interesting opportunities for local suppliers (i.e. Mexican investment). Thus, it re-
quires a reformulation of policies under the nafta to replace the “local content” 
requirements by the increase in the number of national suppliers. Mexico deserves 
better. 
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